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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 1984, Mr. Henry William Ramirez completed an
application for a permit to use the Fair Grounds' stall facilities to stable
his horses for the upcoming racing season. There was no charge to Mr.
Ramirez for the use of these facilities. Contained in this agreement was
a stipulation that Mr. Ramirez would assume all risks arising from his
use of the premises and agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Fair
Grounds Corporation.'
This particular facility consisted of two levels. The lower level was
used to stable horses and the upper level was used to store hay and
food for the animals.2 Since it was the common practice to throw hay
down from the upper level, there was no railing or bannister along the
edge of the loft.
Copyright 1992, by LOUSIANA LAW REvtmw.
1. The agreement is found in Appellee's Brief at 21, Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp.,
563 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-CA-2256), rev'd 575 So. 2d 811 (La.
1991). The pertinent clauses ire as follows:
8. It is agreed that neither Fair Grounds Corp., nor any of its officers or
agents shall be in any way liable for any loss, damage, death or injury of any
kind to any person, animal, vehicle or other property arising out of or connected
with the presence on or use of Fair Grounds premises by said Applicant and
all employees, agents, jockeys, members of the families, property and animals
of said Applicant, whether such injury, loss, death or damage is claimed to be
caused by the condition of said premise or any act or negligence or omissions
to act of Fair Grounds or of its agents or servants or from any other cause,
and the undersigned Applicant hereby specifically assumes all such risks fully
and completely.
9. The undersigned Applicant hereby agrees to indemnify and save harmless
Fair Grounds Corp. and its respective officers, employees and agents from any
and all liabilities, claims and demands for damages, injuries, deaths or losses
or costs or expenses of any kind resulting from or arising out of or claimed
to result from or arise out of the presence on or use of said premises at Fair
Grounds by said Applicant and all employees, agents, jockeys, members of the
families, property and animals of Applicant and Applicant agrees to defend any
claim or suit which may arise from the foregoing and to pay all attorneys (sic]
fees and costs thereof.
2. Original Brief on Behalf of Relator Henry William Ramirez at 2, Ramirez v.
Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d Sl1 (La. 1991) (No. 90-C-1632).
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On February 10, 1985, Mr. Ramirez was on the upper level throwing
alfalfa down to the horses. In the process, he lost his balance and fell
to the ground, sustaining injuries to his heels and feet.' Mr. Ramirez
filed suit against the Fair Grounds Corporation, alleging strict liability.'
The Fair Grounds filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
the permit agreement. The trial court granted this motion and dismissed
the suit.' The fourth circuit court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
decision6 based on its determination that Louisiana Civil Code article
20041 did not nullify the hold harmless agreement entered into by the
parties as alleged by Mr. Ramirez. Another factor that weighed in this
decision was the fact that the plaintiff had been a horse trainer at the
Fair Grounds for over ten years,' which indicated to the court that Mr.
Ramirez was indeed familiar with the stall facilities at the Fair Grounds. 9
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed. 0
The basis of this opinion was that Louisiana Civil Code article 2004
nullified the agreement because there was physical injury involved." In
the opinion, the supreme court noted that the official comments to
Article 2004 state that the article does not apply to such hold harmless
agreements or indemnity clauses. 2 However, the court went on to say
that the comments to the article "have no legislative effect on the statute
because they are not part of the law."' 3 Looking at Article 2004, the
court said that the statute was "clear and unambiguous with respect to
the issue in this case '"14 and, "[accordingly, there is no justification
3. For a detailed description of the plaintiff's fall, see Relator's Original Brief at
2, Ramirez (No. 90-C-1632).
4. Mr. Ramirez alleged strict liability based on La. Civ. Code arts. 2317, 2322.
5. Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 811, 812 (La. 1991).
6. Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 563 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 2004 provides:
Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one
party for intentional or gross fault that causes damage to the other party.
Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one
party for causing physical injury to the other party.
8. 563 So. 2d at 572.
9. Mr. Ramirez had signed agreements identical to the one in force at the time of
his injury for seven years. See Original Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Respondent Fair
Grounds Corporation at 13, Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 811 (La. 1991)
(No. 90-C-1632).
10. Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 811 (La. 1991).
11. Id. at 812.
12. Id. at 813. Official comment (e) to art. 2004 states:
This Article does not govern "indemnity" clauses, "hold harmless" agreements,
or other agreements where parties allocate between themselves, the risk of
potential liability towards third persons.
13. 575 So. 2d at 813.
14. Id. The court relied on La. Civ. Code art. 9 (1988), which provides:
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for ... considering the comments even as persuasive sources or inter-
pretive aids . . .- ,
The rapid disposition of this case and the broad language that the
court used will serve as the basis of this note. First, this note will
examine the general freedom to contract theory. Second, the status of
express assumption of risk will be analyzed. Third, cases will be analyzed
where the courts have upheld similar hold harmless agreements. Fourth,
the difference, or lack thereof, between strict liability and negligence
will be presented. Fifth, specific examples of areas where the courts and
the legislature have barred such agreements will be analyzed. Sixth, a
study of where such agreements have expressly been sanctioned will be
conducted. Finally, the reasons why Article 2004 should not act to
nullify the agreement in this case will be presented.
In examining the court's decision, one must remember that it was
by contract that the Fair Grounds sought to rid itself of liability toward
Mr. Ramirez, and it is the validity of this contract that brought about
the present litigation. However, the question of validity encompasses
many different policy concerns. Therefore, the appropriate place to begin
is with the basic principles involved.
II. GENERAL FREEDOM TO CONTRACT THEORY
Persons of proper capacity may contract for all objects that are
lawful, possible, and determined or determinable.' 6 The effect of such
an agreement is that the agreement becomes the law between the parties. 7
There are even some instances where such a contract may have the
effect of law even as to third persons that are not parties to the
agreement. 8 However, such contractual agreements must stay within the
parameters set by the legislature and our courts.
The legislature has stated this policy in the following manner:
Individuals can not by their conventions, derogate from the
force of laws made for the preservation of public order or good
morals.
But in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly
prohibited, they can renounce what the law has established in
When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to
absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further inter-
pretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.
15. 575 So. 2d at 813.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 1971.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
18. La. R.S. 9:3221 (1991). See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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their favor, when the renunciation does not affect the rights of
others, and is not contrary to the public good. 19
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized these principles in Salles v.
Stafford, Derbes and Roy20 when it pronounced that "[t]he policy of
the law is that all men of lawful age and competent understanding shall
have the utmost liberty of contracting, and their contracts, when freely
and voluntarily made, are not lightly to be interfered with by the
courts." 2' The courts are to hold the agreements sacred unless the intent
is clearly unlawful. 2
The contractual agreement in this particular case was the permit
agreement signed by Mr. Ramirez. Mr. Ramirez voluntarily signed the
agreement, which relieved the Fair Grounds of liability, to acquire the
free use of the stall facilities. It is this agreement that the court nullified
in the present decision.
III. How DOEs ExPREss ASSUMPTION OF RISK FIT INTO LOUISI4A
LAW?
The part of the permit agreement at issue in the Ramirez decision
pertained to Mr. Ramirez assuming responsibility for damages arising
from his use of the premises. This type of agreement is known as an
express assumption of risk. A general statement of how the common
law has treated such agreements is found in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts:
A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to
accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or
reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agree-
ment is invalid as contrary to public policy. 23
The hold harmless agreement that is the subject of the present case is
subject to the limits of public policy concerns as expressed in the
Restatement.
The comments to the Restatement provide the reader with examples
of certain agreements that would be invalid because of public policy
concerns. One such example is when an employee agrees to hold an
employer harmless for injuries sustained in the course of his employ-
19. La. Civ. Code art. 11 (1870). This article was subsequently replaced by La. Civ.
Code art. 7 (1988). Article 7 states:
I Persons may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the
protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an
absolute nullity.
20. 173 La. 361, 137 So. 62 (1931).
21. Id. at 364, 137 So. at 63.
22. Id., 137 So. at 63.
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1965).
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ment.24 Another impermissible situation occurs when the party relieving
himself from liability is an entity charged with a duty of public service.2
The last example of an area where such agreements are not enforced
is when there exists a wide disparity of bargaining power between the
parties.26 The disparity must be of such degree that the agreement does
not represent the free choice of the injured person. 2'
The Louisiana courts have struggled with the effect of assumption
of risk on plaintiff recovery. Since there is very little civilian doctrine
on the subject, the Louisiana courts have looked to the common law
for development of the theory.2" In doing so, the courts have had to
divide potential plaintiffs into identifiable classes so that they can be
analyzed in a manner similar to the common law.29
In Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,30 the court said that assumption
of risk no longer had a place in Louisiana. 1 This theory was to be
absorbed into the comparative fault doctrine. 2 However, the court re-
alized that a contractual assumption of risk should occupy a special
place in Louisiana tort law. In barring the term assumption of risk
from being used to refer to plaintiff conduct, the court recognized that
their "answer" ... does not change the law in those cases where the
plaintiff, by oral or written agreement, expressly waives or releases a
future right to recover damages from the defendant. '3 4 Under the duty/
risk analysis," this principle would be expressed by saying that the
24. Id. comment f.
25. Id. comment g (1965).
26. Id. comment j (1965).
27. Id.
28. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1130 (La. 1988).
29. Id. at 1131. The common law categories are:
1) express consent (when the plaintiff has expressly agreed with the defendant,
in writing, to accept the risk of injury),
2) implied primary (when the plaintiffs have participated in certain activities,
or placed themselves in situations which involve inherent and well known risks),
3) implied secondary (when the plaintiff is found to have disregarded a risk
created by the defendant's fault).
Id.
30. 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
31. Id. at 1132.
32. See La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
33. The court decision was an answer to a Certified Question from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 821 F.2d 272 (5th
Cir. 1987). The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted certification in Murray v. Ramada
Inns, Inc., 514 So. 2d 21 (1987).
34. 521 So. 2d at 1134.
35. See Forest v. State, 493 So. 2d 563 (La. 1986), for an analysis of the duty/risk
method. The court develops the method through the following questions:
1) Was defendant's conduct a cause in fact of the accident?
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defendant was relieved by contract of the duty he owed to the plaintiff.3 6
The conclusion to be reached here is that contractual transfer of liability
is still alive and well in Louisiana after the Murray decision.
Although the Murray decision did indicate that Article 2004 may
serve as a limitation on express assumption of risk," it is the purpose
of this note to explain why Article 2004 should not apply to these facts.
Such a contractual agreement was signed by Mr. Ramirez in the present
case, and, therefore, the Murray decision should not serve to nullify
the agreement between the parties.
IV. CASES WHERE THE COURTS HAVE UPHELD SIMILAR AGREEMENTS
Since the comments to Article 2004 tell us that it does not change
the law,38 it is appropriate to look at Louisiana jurisprudence where the
courts have upheld agreements similar to the one at issue in the Ramirez
decision. Though all of these decisions were decided under the prior
law, before the enactment of Louisiana Civil Code article 2004,19 from
a reading of these decisions, one may gain a better understanding of
the public policy concerning exculpation from liability when physical
injury is involved.
In Battig v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,10 suit was filed
for injuries sustained by a retarded child at a school for the mentally
retarded in Louisiana. The child suffered injuries from a burst appendix,
and the parents alleged that the school failed to provide adequate medical
care. Since the plaintiff had let the tort claim prescribe, he had to rely
on a claim in quasi contract.4 The court granted summary judgment
for the defendant based on a release executed by the plaintiff accom-
panying the child's application to the school.42 The agreement in Ramirez
2) Did defendant owe a legal duty which encompassed the particular risk of
harm to which the plaintiff was exposed?
3) Did defendant breach that duty?
4) What damages, if any, did plaintiff sustain?
For an excellent discussion of duty/risk cases, including Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., Inc.
v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962), and subsequent cases
following the duty/risk method of analysis, see also Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on
Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 La. L. Rev. 363 (1970).
36. 521 So. 2d at 1134.
37. Id.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 2004 comment (a).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 11 (1870). See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Also,
comment (a) to art. 2004 states: "This article is new. It does not change the law, however."
40. 482 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. La. 1977), aff'd, 608 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1979).
41. For a definition of quasi-contract, see La. Civ. Code art. 2293.
42. For text of release see 482 F. Supp. at 342:
It is agreed and understood that if this applicant is accepted, St. Mary's School
for Retarded Children, the Diocese of Alexandria, the Bishop of Alexandria
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is very similar to this in that it operated as a pre-release. Presumably,
such agreements are taken into account when the parties are bargaining
as to the price to be charged for the service provided. Therefore, this
case supports the proposition that there is nothing contra bonos mores3
in contracting away liability for physical injury prior to the enactment
of Louisiana Civil Code article 2004.
Forsyth v. Jefferson Downs, Inc."4 is another appellate court decision
where the court had to struggle with an agreement similar to the one
in the present case. In Forsyth, the race. track was being repaired and
the management did not want activity on the track for fear of injury.
Trainers who wished to exercise their horses were required to sign an
agreement that they were doing so at their own risk. 5 A trainer signed
the agreement and his horse was injured. The horse's owner then brought
suit against the race track.' The court proclaimed that "it is not in
contravention of public policy for a party to assume the risk of injuring
himself or his property in consideration for his being allowed to use
the premises of a race track."'" This court was clearly able to see the
importance of the race track requiring the trainers to be liable for their
own damages because Jefferson Downs did not want them on the racing
area unless the liability for injury could be shifted from the race track
to the racing participants. The trainers showed their willingness to deny
themselves a tort claim in exchange for being allowed to use the racing
facilities.
In similar fashion, Mr. Ramirez waived his tort claim for the free
use of the facilities. In essence, this was a bargained-for exchange by
two capable and willing parties. Surely the Fair Grounds would not give
the trainers free use of the facilities if in doing so, the Fair Grounds
placed itself in a position of potential liability for claims arising from
the trainers' use of the premises.
Another case decided by the Louisiana appellate courts did indeed
and all other persons acting in their behalf shall be and they are hereby released
from any and all liability of every nature, kind and description as a result of
any injuries, hurt or damage sustained by the child herein described.
Id. (emphasis added).
43. Black's Law Dictionary defines this term as against good morals. Black's Law
Dictionary 322 (6th ed. 1990).
44. 152 So. 2d 369 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 895, 154 So. 2d 767
(1963).
45. For text of release see 152 So. 2d at 374: "We, the undersigned Horsemen, agree
that our horses are exercising or training on the race track at our own risk and that any
injury to the exercise boy, jockey, 'or trainer or any injury to the horses will be at our
own risk.
46. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
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involve physical injury. Robillard v. P & R Racetracks, Inc.4 involved
physical injuries sustained by a drag racer when he collided with a
disabled vehicle on the track. The injured racer sued the owner of the
drag strip, the track operator, two major stockholders of the companies
that owned and operated the track, and several individual track em-
ployees. Prior to racing his car, the claimant had signed an agreement
containing a release clause." The court held that the release clause signed
by the participant acted to nullify liability on behalf of the defendants
because "Robillard knew of the inherent dangers involved in drag racing.
He was an experienced drag car racer. He was aware of the risk,
understood it, and appreciated it before he signed the assumption of
risk release clause . . . . 49
Applying this rationale to the Ramirez case, Mr. Ramirez realized
what tasks his job would encompass on the premises. He knew that he
would have to retrieve hay for his horses. After all, Mr. Ramirez had
been in the training business for many years, and a great many of those
years were spent at the Fair Grounds.
V. STRICT LIABILITY As OPPOSED TO NEGLIGENCE; WHAT IS THE
DIFFERENCE IN EXCULPATING ONESELF FROM LIABILITY?
The liability for which Mr. Ramirez is seeking relief is strict liability.
Therefore, it is appropriate to look at strict liability and negligence and
see where the differences lie.
The Louisiana Civil Code differentiates between degrees of fault."0
Policy concerns allow for a greater ability to contract away from slight
fault than to exculpate oneself from liability caused by gross fault. For
example, if the law allowed individuals to contractually avoid liability
imposed because of intentional acts, the obligation would be subject to
a condition that depended solely on the whim of the obligor." The
effect of such a condition is to render the obligation null."
The liability that the plaintiff seeks to impose on the defendant in
the Ramirez case is strict liability. The Louisiana Civil Code imposes
strict liability based on custody" and ownership,5 4 and Louisiana juris-
prudence has likened the duty of strict liability to the duty that arises
from ordinary negligence.55 The only difference in determining whether
a duty was owed is that, in proving strict liability, the claimant is
47. 405 So. 2d 1203 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1981).
48. For complete text of agreement, see id. at 1208.
49. Id. at 1208.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 3556(13). The three degrees of fault are: gross fault, slight
fault and very slight fault.
51. See La. Civ. Code art. 2004 comment(a), and La. Civ. Code art. 1770.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 1770.
53. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.
54. La. Civ. Code art. 2322.
55. Kent v. Gulf States Utilities, 418 So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1982).
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relieved of proving that "the owner knew or should have known of the
risk involved. ' 56
In the case of Loescher v. Parr," the Louisiana Supreme Court
pronounced that strict liability was imposed based solely on the rela-
tionship between the person legally responsible and the object that causes
the harm."8 Given that the duty arising from strict liability and ordinary
negligence is similar and that strict liability merely alleviates the need
for the claimant to prove knowledge on behalf of the defendant, it
would appear that agreements transferring strict liability would be closely
scrutinized by the courts-much like the scrutiny applied when ordinary
negligence is shifted between the parties. However, that is not the
indication given by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The court has chosen
to provide for a lesser burden on potential defendants in strict liability
to prove that the liability has indeed been shifted to another party. This
theory was brought to light in Sovereign Insurance Co. v. Texas Pipe
Line Co. 9
When the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal was faced with
an indemnity agreement that purported to allow indemnity for a strict
liability claim, the court applied the standard test used for finding
indemnity agreements in ordinary negligence cases. 60 That is, such an
intent to indemnify must be expressed in "unequivocal terms."16' How-
ever, this conclusion was subsequently reversed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. 62 The court held that the presumption against finding an indemnity
agreement as used in ordinary negligence actions does not apply to strict
liability under Civil Code article 2317.63 Instead, the general rules for
contract interpretation should apply.64 Further, the court explained that
the reason behind this was that in strict liability
[T]he indemnitor usually is in as good a position as the indem-
nitee to evaluate and protect against the risk. Correlatively,
indemnity against liability for the custodianship of dangerous
things does not provide as great a disincentive to careful and
56. Id. This illustrates the doctrine of imputed knowledge as it relates to strict liability.
57. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976).
58. Id. at 446.
59. 488 So. 2d 982 (La. 1986).
60. Sovereign Ins. Co. v. Texas Pipeline Co., 470 So. 2d 969 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1985), amended and aff'd, 488 So. 2d 982 (1986).
61. Id. at 974. See. also Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1977); Green
v. Taca Int'l Airlines, 304 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974).
62. Sovereign Ins. Co. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 488 So. 2d 982 (La. 1986).
63. Id. at 983.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 2045 provides:
Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the
parties.
1992] 1069
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prudent conduct as does indemnity against the consequences of
the indemnitee's own negligence.65
This theory can be clearly illustrated by the Ramirez decision. Had
the Fair Grounds required Mr. Ramirez to indemnify and hold them
harmless for negligent acts of the Fair Grounds, Mr. Ramirez would
have been in the arduous situation of keeping the Fair Grounds and
its employees from acting negligently. This is to be contrasted with the
strict liability for which Mr. Ramirez did agree to be responsible. True,
the initial obligation of maintaining the premises is on the owner.
However, by shifting this liability to Mr. Ramirez, the burden is shifted
to the party present on the premises daily. This does not occasion an
unjust burden on Mr. Ramirez. He must merely keep a watchful eye
for dangerous conditions on the premises. There is no duty to prevent
the negligent acts of others. Therefore, the shifting of the strict liability
to Mr. Ramirez is a much lesser burden than it may first appear to
be.
VI. AREAS WHERE LIABILITY MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED
In certain instances, the courts have made it known that any attempt
to transfer the liability imposed by law will be disregarded. When making
this determination, the courts should look at the inequities fostered by
such agreements, the relative bargaining power of the parties, and the
overall public policy that is sought to be enforced. Two such areas
where attempts to transfer liability have been nullified are the areas of
employer-employee relationships and the oil industry.
A. Employer-Employee Relationships
1. Jurisprudential Creation
The courts have unequivocally refused to recognize contracts where
employers require employees to hold them harmless for tort damages
and workers' compensation claims. This policy is illustrated in the case
of Gatheright v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co." In Gatheright,
the claimant reported on his application for employment that he had
an existing back condition. Since the job included lifting heavy objects,
the claimant's employer required, as a condition of employment, that
the claimant sign a waiver of liability in favor of the employer. This
65. 488 So. 2d at 986 (emphasis added).




waiver extended to any "back injury directly connected with a pre-
existing injury." 67 The defendant interpreted the agreement to extend to
both tort claims and workers' compensation claims. The court une-
quivocally stated that "[s]uch waivers are contrary to public policy and
are void."" Based on the invalidity of the waiver, the third circuit court
of appeal affirmed the trial court's award of total and permanent
workers' compensation benefits to the claimant.69
There are several reasons why this policy is good for society. Com-
mentators have stated:
Where the defendant and the plaintiff are employer and em-
ployee, and the agreement relates to injury to the employee in
the course of his employment, the courts are generally agreed
that it will not be given effect. The basis for such a result
usually is stated to be the disparity in bargaining power and
the economic necessity which forces the employee to accept the
employer's terms, with the general policy of the law which
protects him against the employer's negligence and against un-
reasonable contracts of employment.70
The court's position reflects society's concern about situations where
employers involved in risky industries require employees to agree not
to hold the employer liable for their injuries sustained. The basis of
this reasoning is the prevailing need for all to earn a living.
In Ramirez there was no such employer-employee relationship. There
was no requirement that the horses be stabled on the premises. Owners
of horses which were stabled elsewhere merely had to get written au-
thorization to race at the Fair Grounds.7 Therefore, Mr. Ramirez's
ability to earn a living was not hindered by the permit agreement.
The Ramirez decision can also be contrasted with the decision in
Wolf v. Louisiana State Racing Commission. 72 In Wolf, the jockeys
were forced to accept workers' compensation coverage even though they
were independent contractors and not employees. Jockeys that failed to
sign the agreement were excluded from race meetings. 7 The court held
the waiver to be invalid. Unlike Wolf, Mr. Ramirez's sanction for not
signing the agreement was merely losing his right to the free use of the
stalls, not being barred from training.
67. Id. at 577.
68. Id. at 579 (citing Haven v. Munson, 169 So. 819, 820 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936)).
69. 267 So. 2d at 577.
70. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B comment f (1965).
71. Condition of Stall Allocation, contained in Appellee's Brief at 21, Ramirez (No.
89-CA-2256).
72. 545 So. 2d 976 (La. 1989).
73. Id. at 977.
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There are two further distinguishing factors between Wolf and Ra-
mirez. First, the jockeys in Wolf signed only after a clause was added
allowing them to sign under protest . 4 Mr. Ramirez did not protest the
agreement that he signed and returned to the Fair Grounds. Second,
the Louisiana State Racing Commission has the exclusive power to
determine who is to be excluded from the grounds." Mr. Ramirez would
suffer no such exclusion. Therefore, Mr. Ramirez was not faced, as
were the jockeys in Wolf, with the possibility of impairing his right to
earn a living by refusing to sign the agreement.
2. Legislative Creation
Given the policy concerns, the Louisiana legislature has also taken
steps to protect employees from employers. The legislature enacted a
statute providing that the release of an employee-tortfeasor by the plain-
tiff acts to bar the employer from seeking indemnity for the vicarious
liability that the employer incurred.7 6 The fourth circuit court of appeal
recently held that the immunity was personal to the employee and did
not extend to the employer's insurer.7 The importance of this holding
is that it places emphasis on protecting the employee. The second circuit
court of appeal has stated that if employers could get indemnity from
employees, they would subvert the "notion that the employer, who reaps
the ultimate gain from the toil of his employee, should bear the ultimate
cost of the enterprise." '78 The underlying policy is that all in our society
should be free to be employed and such actions by a well-heeled employer
will be unfair to employees.7 9 In addition, such indemnity provisions
are contrary to modern practices of risk redistribution."0
Given the actions of the courts and the legislature, it is readily
apparent that the underlying policy is to protect the employee. This
includes both an employee-victim and an employee-tortfeasor. However,
in the Ramirez decision there exists no employer-employee relationship
that demands such public policy concerns. Therefore, this limitation on
employers exculpating themselves from liability should not apply to the
Ramirez decision.
74. Id.
75. La. R.S. 4:193 (1987).
76. La. R.S. 9:3921 (1991).
77. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 579 So. 2d 1090,
1093 ,(La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
78. Finley v. Bass, 478 So. 2d 608, 616 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
79. Id.
80. John C. Folkenroth, Comment, The Employer's Indemnity Action, 34 La. L.




Another specific area where the Louisiana legislature has disallowed
the transfer of liability is in the oil industry. The legislation is widely
known as the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act of 1981,11 and it states,
in pertinent part:
[A]n inequity is foisted on certain contractors and their em-
ployees by the defense or indemnity provisions ... contained
in some agreements . .. to the extent those provisions apply to
death or bodily injury to persons. It is the intent of the legislature
by this Section to declare null and void and against public policy
of the state of Louisiana any provision in any agreement which
requires defense and/or indemnification, for death or bodily
injury to persons, where there is negligence or fault (strict li-
ability) on the part of the indemnitee, or an agent or employee
of the indemnitee, or an independent contractor who is directly
responsible to the indemnitee.82
The legislature passed the statute in response to the oilfield contractors'
concern over widespread use of such provisions in oilfield service con-
tracts. 3 The effect of this provision is to place the burden on the major
oil companies that are in a much better position to spread the loss than
the drilling contractors. This is a valid policy under both the general
tort compensation theory of loss spreading and the idea that workers
in a specific hazardous industry are getting injured while a much broader
spectrum of society benefits from the production. The most viable reason
for such a risk distribution scheme in the oil industry is the tremendous
economic impact the industry has on the Louisiana economy.
Given these illustrations, one can see that the legislature has made
certain policy decisions in enacting the statutes that prohibit the free
transfer of liability. These policies include the right of employees to
earn a living and preserving the scheme of risk distribution as evidenced
by the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act.
VII. LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY PROVIDES FOR FREE SHIFTING OF
LIABILITY BETWEEN LEssoRs AND LESSEES
In other situations, the legislature has expressly provided for the
free transfer of liability. An example of this is the transfer of liability
between the owner of the premises and the lessee of the premises as
81. La. R.S. 9:2780 (1991). The official title is "Certain indemnification agreements
invalid"; however, it is commonly known as the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act of
1981. See Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So. 2d 833, 836 n.6 (La. 1987).
82. La. R.S. 9:2780(A) (1991).
83. Meloy, 504 So. 2d at 837.
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provided by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221." The owner may con-
tractually exculpate himself from liability "unless the owner knew or
should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and
failed to remedy it within a reasonable time."'" Prior to the enactment
of this legislation in 1932, the lessor and lessee could agree that the
lessor would not be liable for injuries sustained by the lessee. However,
the lessor was not allowed to escape the liability imposed upon him as
to third parties."s The basis for this prior jurisprudence was the dis-
tinction between rights and obligations imposed by law, and those im-
posed by contract." Since the obligation of the property owner is imposed-
by law and the obligation of the owner to let another have the use of
his premises is imposed by contract, the obligation imposed by law
cannot be dispensed with by the obligation created by the lease contract. s8
This jurisprudence was overruled by the new lessor/lessee statute in
1932. s9
This statute encountered constitutional attack in the case of Paul
v. Nolen. 9" In upholding the statute, the court stated that "It]here is
nothing fundamentally wrong in permitting lessees to undertake the
upkeep of the property at their own risk .... "91 The court also noted
that no one has a vested right to sue another; the right has to be
provided for by statute.9z "But in this case it [the statute) has not taken
it [the right] away; it has left the right and has merely permitted transfer
of the obligation from one person to another." 9 Since the agreement
in Ramirez is so similar to a lease, it is appropriate to look at cases
interpreting this lessor/lessee statute.
There are numerous cases in Louisiana jurisprudence that allow the
lessor to transfer liability of the premises to the lessee. This transfer
84. La. R.S. 9:3221 (1991) provides:
The owner of premises leased under a contract whereby the lessee assumes
responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury caused by any defect
therein to the lessee or anyone on the premises who derives his right to be
thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew or should have known of the
defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable
time.
85. Id.
86. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1926).
87. Id. at 69, 111 So. at 499.
88. Id., Ill So. at 499.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
90. 166 So. 509 (La. App. OrI. 1936).
91. Id. at 511.
92. Id. See also State v. Stanford Oil Co. of La., 188 La. 978, 1009, 178 So. 601,
611 (1937) (citing the Corpus Juris: "[Tihere is no vested right to a particular remedy.")
12 C.J. Constitutional Law § 558 (1917).
93. 166 So. at 511.
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has included liability for both physical injury94 and property damage. 9"
In Davis v. Copeland Enterprises, Inc.," a worker sustained serious
burns while recharging the refrigeration system in a warehouse. The
lessee of the premises, also the, employer of the injured party, had
assumed responsibility in the lease agreement for such a defect as au-
thorized by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221. The court stated that
the lease provision released the owner of the premises from "legal liability
for the condition of the premises and from liability for injuries caused
by defects therein . . . "
A later Louisiana Supreme Court case examining the effect of Louis'
iana Revised Statutes 9:3221 is Tassin v. Slidell Mini-Storage, Inc." In
Tassin, the court was faced with a property damage claim arising from
water damage in a storage unit. The court discussed the owner/lessor's
liability for damages from vices and defects, and then went on to state:
"Nevertheless, the owner can shift responsibility for condition of the
premises including liability for injury caused by any defect therein to
the lessee pursuant to La. R.S. 9:3221.""
VIII. WHY ARTICLE 2004 SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THIS DECISION
Given the history of jurisprudence and legislation allowing and dis-
allowing contractual transfer of liability, a close examination of Louis-
iana Civil Code article 2004 is now in order. Louisiana Civil Code article
2004 states:
Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the
liability of one party for 'intentional or gross fault that causes
damage to the other party.
Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the
liability of one party for causing physical injury to the other
party.
The second clause of the article was at issue in the Ramirez decision.
The Louisiana Supreme *Court nullified the hold harmless agreement
based on an application of this clause. Article 2004 is new to Louisiana
94. Davis v. Copeland Enter., Inc., 390 So. 2d 891 (La. 1980), rev'g Davis v. Morrow,
381 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff sprayed with ammonia and suffered
serious burns).
95. Meyers v. Drewes, 196 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff sustained
damage to clothing and furniture due to condition of the premises).
%. 390 So. 2d 891 (La. 1980).
97. Id. at 893, rev'g Davis v. Morrow, 381 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
98. 396 So. 2d 1261 (La. 1981).
99. Id. at 1264. However, in this case, the court held the defendant-lessor to be
liable because he knew or should have known of the defects. This defect was that the
door would not seal properly on the bottom. Id.
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and the source articles are found in both the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 and in codes of foreign jurisdictions.0 The apparent reasoning
behind the article is to protect the physical integrity of human beings.' 0'
No matter how broadly this article is interpreted, commentators
suggest that there should be exceptions to the general rule. One com-
mentator has stated that "a clause excluding liability for slight fault is
valid even if it contemplates damage to the physical or moral integrity
of a person; at least it must be regarded as valid when there has been
an assumption of risk by the injured party."'0 2 In Louisiana, one such
exception to the general principle can be found in Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221.103 Further, one of the source articles for Article 2004
expresses a similar concept. The Quebec Draft Civil Code states the
principle in the following manner:
No person may exclude or limit his responsibility for injury to
the person, subject to express provision of law.1' 4
This indicates that, perhaps, the redactors of Article 2004 did not intend
for the article to absolutely nullify all provisions that exclude liability
for injury to the person.
This idea is reinforced by the comments to the article. For example,
the official comments to the article state that the article is new, but it
does not change the law. 05 The comments also state that the article
"does not govern 'indemnity' clauses, 'hold harmless' agreements, or
other agreements where parties allocate between themselves, the risk of
potential liability towards third persons."'16
Prior to Ramirez, another Louisiana appellate decision, Banner Chev-
rolet v. Wells Fargo Guard Services,'0 7 discussed the application of
Louisiana Civil Code article-2004. The Banner Chevrolet case dealt with
a car being stolen while the defendant was contractually obligated to
100. The source articles are: La. Civ. Code arts. Il, 19, 1901, 1930, 2504, and 3556(13)
(1870); Italian Civil Code art. 1229; Quebec Draft Civil Code arts. 300-303 (1977);
Argentine Civil Code art. 507; Swiss Code of Obligations art.. 100; Greek Civil Code art.
332. See La. Civ. Code art. 2004.
101. For a brief discussion of how physical integrity of persons directly affects the
public order, see Saul Litvinoff, Stipulation As To Liability and As To Damages, 52
Tul. L. Rev. 258, 281 (1978) [hereinafter Litvinoff].
102. Litvinoff, supra note 101, at 281.282. Commentator Demogue maintains that a
sign put up by an innkeeper excluding liability for damages caused by horses would be
valid even if the injury is to the person. Litvinoff, supra note 101, at 282 n.139.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86. La. Civ. Code art. 2004 comment (f)
states: "This article does not supersede R.S. 9:3221."
104. Civil Code Revision Office, Report on the Quebec Civil Code, v. I Draft Civil
Code art. 301, 378 (1977) (emphasis added).
105. La. Civ. Code art. 2004 comment a.
106. La. Civ. Code art. 2004 comment e.
107. 508 So. 2d 966 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 521076
NOTES
provide security services. In passing, the court recited the language of
the article.1°  This was mere dicta as there was no physical injury
involved, and the court went on to say that recovery was based on a
breach of a contract claim, not a negligence claim for damages. 1 9 When
this same court of appeal was later faced with the Ramirez case, the
court held that "La. Civil Code article 2004 has no effect on the release
of liability or indemnity and hold harmless agreements found in the
contract herein." 0
Given the applicable background, Article 2004 should not nullify
the hold harmless agreement between Mr. Ramirez and the Fair Grounds.
There are several reasons for this result. First, the liability that the Fair
Grounds sought to avoid is strict liability. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has already stated that avoiding strict liability does not give rise to the
same public policy concerns as does exculpating oneself from ordinary
negligence."' When one is relieved of liability for his negligent acts, he
no longer has an incentive to be, non-negligent. For example, if one
party agrees to indemnify another for the indemnitee's own negligent
acts, there would be a problem regarding the principles of equity."'
Part of the reason for this is the indemnitor's inability to "evaluate,
predict, or control the risk which may be created by the indemnitee's
future conduct .... ,,13
The same concerns are not implicated when one party contracts
away his or her liability which may arise under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2317. When strict liability is shifted from one party to another,
there are no personal acts to evaluate, predict, or control. The hazards
are conditions of the premises. Therefore, either party is usually in as
good a position as the other to evaluate the hazards and protect agains
the risk." 4
Next, custody of the stall was turned over to Mr. Ramirez." ' This
placed him in the best position to discover such defects. Finally, this
108. Id. at 967.
109. Id. at 968.
110. Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 563 So. 2d 570, 571-572 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1990).
111. See Sovereign Ins. Co. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 488 So. 2d 982 (La. 1986),
discussed supra text accompanying note 62.
112. Id. at 986.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See generally, Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Thielman, 395 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir.
1968), ("There is clearly a distinction between holding that public policy forbids a contract
whereby an attempt is made to prospectively absolve one of liability for injuries negligently
caused through instrumentalities in his exclusive control and holding that public policy
allows a contract whereby one agrees to assume the risk of injuring himself when he is




fact situation should be governed by the general policy of allowing
transfer of premises liability as between lessors and lessees.
Since strict liability is concerned with the condition of the premises,
not a particular negligent act, anyone that is on the premises is in as
good a position as another to protect against such risks." 6 In this
particular case, Mr.Ramirez was the person who was on the premises
everyday; he could best identify the risks and take the proper precautions.
In addition, when it is strict liability that is transferred, there still exists
a person or entity with an incentive to maintain the premises in a safe
condition. Mr. Ramirez, knowing he had assumed responsibility, had
good reason to keep a watchful eye. This is opposed to the situation
where two persons agree that one will hold the other harmless for any
injury received to that person through the negligence of the other. The
person who knows he will not be responsible for his acts will have no
incentive to act in a reasonable manner. 1 7
Given the applicable background of strict liability, Article 2004
should not apply to injuries caused by a condition of the premises for
which the defendant is strictly liable. This theory is reinforced in Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 9:3221, which allows the lessor and the lessee to
freely transfer liability for the condition of the premises. Though the
lessor may be initially obligated under Article 2317, he may transfer
this liability to the lessee who then has an incentive to maintain a safe
premises.
As to the actual agreement entered into by the parties, it was a
lease for all practical purposes. The necessities for a contract of lease
are thing, price, and consent."18 Given the facts, there is no disputing
that the parties agreed on the thing. Also, with the alternatives available
to Mr. Ramirez, there are no facts to indicate his consent being vitiated.
Since the price need not consist of money," 9 perhaps the surrendering
of a possible tort claim is the "price" Mr. Ramirez paid for the "free"
use of the stall facilities.'20
Nevertheless, if this agreement is not termed a lease, it should be
treated the same. That is, the concept of free transfer of strict liability
116. Sovereign Ins. Co. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 488 So. 2d 982, 986 (La. 1986).
117. W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Torts 25 (5th ed. 1984). (One reason for imposing
liability is to provide incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm.) See also, Seavey,
Speculations As To "Respondent Superior", in Harvard Legal Essays, 433, 448 (1934).
(A specific example of this is that respondent superior results in greater care in the
selection and instruction of servants than would be used otherwise.) (emphasis in original).
118. La. Civ. Code art. 2670.
119. La. Civ. Code art. 2671.
120. The permit agreement reads as follows: "Said Applicant hereby agrees, as a
condition precedent to and in consideration of, the acceptance of this Application and
Agreement and to induce you to grant the free use of said stall space and facilities ....
Appellee's Brief at 21, Ramirez (No. 89-CA-2256).
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stemming from Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 should be applied to
these facts. This should be treated as an exception to the general rule
pronounced in Louisiana Civil Code article 2004, and the Fair Grounds
should be able to freely transfer the strict liability of the premises to
Mr. Ramirez.
The facts of this case indicate that Mr. Ramirez was much like a
lessee. Mr. Ramirez had the exclusive right to stable his horses in the
stall, much like the lessee is guaranteed peaceful possession during the
term of the lease.'' Another similarity, is that Mr. Ramirez could only
make additions and alterations to the facility after receiving written
permission from the Fair Grounds.'" The comparable lease provision
states that the lessor may not make alterations in the thing during the
term of the lease. 2
3
This is not to say that Article 2004 should be written out of the
civil code. An example of a correct application of Article 2004 is
expressed in the following hypothetical.' 2' Suppose a building contractor
and a subcontractor (sub) are working alongside each other in the
construction process. As a requirement to allowing the sub to bid on
the job, the contractor required that the sub sign a hold harmless
agreement for any injury caused to the sub by the negligent acts of the
contractor. While working together, the negligence of the contractor
causes the sub to suffer a severed arm. Article 2004 should apply and
nullify the agreement. The basis of this conclusion is that the liability
here is ordinary negligence and the two contracting parties were both
the party that caused the injury and the party that sustained the injury.
We do not want to place one party in the particularly harsh situation
of requiring him to police the actions of another party. This fits the
language of Louisiana Civil Code article 2004: "Any clause is null that,
in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one party for causing
physical injury to the other party." Thus, the injured party should be
able to recover for the injuries sustained.
Another scenario will adequately demonstrate that there is another
problem with Article 2004 as interpreted by the court in Ramirez. This
problem comes about when a third party becomes involved and sustains
injury. Suppose that Mr. Ramirez invited a friend over to the stall to
121. La. Civ. Code art. 2692.
122. The pertinent part of the permit agreement is as follows:
7. Additions or alterations to any Fair Grounds buildings, painting or construc-
tion of any kind, will be permitted ONLY with written permission of the General
Superintendent.
(Emphasis in original). Appellee's Brief at 21, Ramirez (No. 89-CA-2256).
123. La. Civ. Code art. 2698.
124. For purposes of this example, the pertinent employer immunities available under
the Worker's Compensation Statutes are ignored.
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help him feed the horses. While getting down hay, the friend falls in
exactly the same manner that Mr. Ramirez fell in the current case. Now
this third person, not a party to the permit agreement, seeks to recover
from the Fair Grounds. Since Article 2004 only contemplates two parties, '
it should not act to nullify the agreement entered into by the parties
since the injury was sustained by a third party. Instead, this situation
should be governed by the theory of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221.
That is, the Fair Grounds and Mr. Ramirez should be able to freely
allocate the risk of injury on the premises between themselves with their
permit agreement.
In the above scenario, this injured third party would have no cause
of action against the Fair Grounds. Such a result would surely be unjust.
Allowing the party that signed the agreement to recover and then not
allowing an innocent. third person the same action is surely an absurd
consequence 26 not intended by the legislature in promulgating the article.
A better approach to the agreement in Ramirez would have been
to rely on the underlying rationale of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221
and allow the transfer of liability from the Fair Grounds to Mr. Ramirez.
This would be adhering to the prior jurisprudence that in certain si-
tuations there may be a transfer of liability even though physical injury
is involved.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Ramirez decision has the potential to destroy the validity of
all contractual agreements to transfer liability when physical injury is
involved. The broad language in the opinion may be read to nullify
any agreement when there exists an injury to a person. A very interesting
scenario will unfold when the court has to decide a case involving
physical injury when there is a lease agreement and the lessee has agreed
to assume liability pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 for
injuries sustained on the premises. The court will be forced to choose
between Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 and Louisiana Civil Code
article 2004. Although the official comments to Article 2004 state that
the statute does not supersede 9:3221, the supreme court has stated that
the comments are not the law and that this article is clear and un-
ambiguous; therefore, there is no need to look for interpretive aids.
If Article 2004 is held to apply to leases, there will be a substantial
125. See La. Civ. Code art. 2004: "the liability of one party for causing physical
injury to the other party." (emphasis added).
126. La. Civ. Code art. 9 (1988) provides:
When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to
absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further inter-
pretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.
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shift in responsibility between lessors and lessees. The reasoning is that
numerous leases have been contracted with this stipulation of liability
with the parties having full expectation they would be given effect. This
notion of responsibility is taken into account when the terms, including
the price, are being negotiated. In many situations, the lessor is many
miles away from the premises and relies on the lessee to keep the
premises in good repair.
In short, the Ramirez decision tells us that the entity charged with
liability cannot contractually release itself of that liability when physical
injury is involved. As such, lessors who have these provisions in their
leases should keep the Ramirez decision in mind when they are nego-
tiating the price to be paid for the lease. An alternative idea is that
the lessor could require the lessee to purchase an insurance policy in
favor of the lessor should such liability arise. This would serve to protect
the lessor should he be held responsible in spite of the exculpating clause
in the lease.
Neal Joseph Kling
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